Eisenhower Media Network Statement on Nuclear Weapons Policy and Strategy

As former military and intelligence officers, we understand that nuclear weapons proliferation globally and US abandonment of arms control treaties have made the world more dangerous. We are witnessing direct and indirect American involvement in wars where the suggestion of the use of nuclear weapons is not dismissible. The nuclear armed world is more complex. Adversaries increasingly miscommunicate and misunderstand each other, exacerbating geopolitical stability. We concur with the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ estimate that our planet faces the greatest danger of nuclear war since the end of World War Two. 

Concurrently, the massive cost of building and maintaining the United States nuclear forces outweighs the benefits. While deterrence remains a core principle of U.S. defense, and one we do not disagree with, advances in technology have exposed the American nuclear doctrine of a land, sea and air Triad to be an economically exhaustive relic of the 20th century. 

The Eisenhower Media Network recommends the following actions to increase stability and restore trust between nuclear powers, while reducing the excessive and unnecessary costs of maintaining a Cold War nuclear force:

No First Use. The US must adopt a clear No First Use policy for nuclear weapons. The ambiguity and uncertainty created by current American policy that allows a first strike are destabilizing and may lead an adversary to strike the US to preempt a suspected American first strike. A No First Use policy provides certainty not only to other nations, but also to service members and civilians in the chain of command as to what and what is not a legal order concerning the use of nuclear weapons by the US.

Return to arms control treaties. The US should seek to reenergize and return to the Anti-Ballistic Missile, Intermediate Nuclear Forces, Open Skies and New START treaties. Anti-ballistic and intermediate range nuclear missiles, including newer hypersonic missiles, are inherently destabilizing weapons, while the loss of surveillance and verification provided through the Open Skies treaty provides only strategic ignorance to both the US and Russia. Secondly, these bilateral treaties can serve as the model for new arms control treaties which include the other seven nuclear powers. With a return to arms control efforts should also come the establishment of clear and regular means of communication between heads of state and relevant principals. There should never be a recurrence of the non-communication between the nuclear powers, as we saw between the governments of Joseph Biden and Vladimir Putin. In accordance with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, non-proliferation should be a key focus of US national security policy. This includes recognition of Israel’s nuclear weapons and implementation of the required constraints on US assistance to Israel, as well as the preclusion of nuclear technologies to allies without safeguards, e.g., Saudi Arabia.

Dismantle the Triad and enter the 21st century. The US nuclear triad consists of land base intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), manned USAF nuclear equipped aircraft, and USN nuclear armed submarines. US ICBMs should be phased out along with manned bombers, to include the proposed B21 bomber. US nuclear strategy and policy should reflect twin priorities of deterrence and nonproliferation/disarmament. In line with the renewal of the ABM treaty, US missile defense, including the Golden Dome program, should be canceled. Effective deterrence can be achieved through the US Navy’s ballistic missile submarines. Their survivability and firepower provide deterrence against both limited and full-scale nuclear attacks. If a secondary echelon of deterrence is required through US strategic bombers and their unmanned replacements, then those squadrons should be assigned to the Reserves and the Air National Guard. The understanding that tactical nuclear weapons pose an unacceptable level of escalation and have extremely limited battlefield utility led to their departure from American inventories following the Cold War. That understanding should direct the elimination of the US’ current and future generation of tactical nuclear weapons.

Keep humans in the loop. The US should have as policy, preferably through legislation, that US nuclear forces will require human control and decision-making at all levels of command and authority.

Convert potential savings to US infrastructure and provide transition for industry and workers. The hundreds of billions, possibly trillions, of dollars in savings from reducing the current and planned US nuclear forces should be reinvested in American society, particularly in science, engineering and other research and development, to increase American prosperity, quality of life and economic competitiveness. A program to transition highly educated, technically advanced nuclear industry workers to other fields where their education and experience will be beneficial should be a core component of any disarmament plan.

US nuclear forces today reflect a 20th-century commitment to an immoral plan to kill tens or hundreds of millions and destroy entire cities. Our understanding of the ensuing nuclear winter following a nuclear war would make any victory pyrrhic. The foolish idea of lower-yield nuclear weapons having a utility in war now appears to have adherents at the highest levels of our government. The overriding concerns about escalatory risk and scientific impossibility that have always existed regarding missile defense remain. The opportunity costs to our society, economy and people from the continued expenditure in support of unneeded and unusable nuclear forces are massive. The United States needs to reject its commitment to its 20th-century Triad, rebuild its nuclear forces in line with 21st-century realities, return to arms control treaties, pursue stabilizing policies (e.g., No First Use) and seek real national security by investing in education, healthcare, infrastructure, research and development and the environment.